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Conference key agreement (CKA), or multipartite key distribution, is a cryptographic task where
more than two parties wish to establish a common secret key. A composition of bipartite quantum
key distribution protocols can accomplish this task. However, the existence of multipartite quantum
correlations allows for new and potentially more efficient protocols, to be applied in future quantum
networks. Here, we review the existing quantum CKA protocols based on multipartite entanglement,
both in the device-dependent and the device-independent scenario.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum mechanics can bring unprecedented advan-
tages to the realization of information processing tasks.
A remarkable example is quantum key distribution
(QKD)[1, 2], arguably the most mature quantum technol-
ogy. QKD allows two parties, Alice and Bob, to securely
communicate by establishing a secret key that is infor-
mation theoretically secure. Security proofs are given for
different levels of assumptions. In the scenario where the
devices and/or quantum states are characterized, robust
security is proven for realistic parameters [3, 4] (see also
[5]) with implementations achieving long distances [6, 7].
Also for the device-independent scenario, i.e. no assump-
tions on the quantum states and on the working behavior
of the devices, a security proof in the fully adversarial sce-
nario is well established [8]. The required experimental
parameters are characterized [9] for protocols based on
the simplest Bell inequality [10].
The extensive development of quantum technological
applications allow near future applications which are
based on genuine multipartite quantum protocols using
shared multipartite entangled states in network struc-
tures [11–17]. Applications range from distributed quan-
tum computing to genuine multipartite quantum com-
munication protocols which may lead to the quantum
internet [18, 19].
Here we focus on conference key agreement (CKA),
or multiparty key distribution, which is a generalization
of the task of key distribution to the scenario in which
N users wish to establish a common secret key. This al-
lows the users to broadcast secure messages in a network.
CKA can e.g. be achieved by, first establishing bipartite
keys between the users, followed by securely distributing
a common key to all other users via the bipartite keys.
This solution has been discussed to be inefficient in the
classical scenario, and several classical protocols allow-
ing the parties to establish a common key were proposed
(see e.g. [20, 21] and [22, 23]). In the quantum scenario,
that is, when the parties can use quantum resources, a
secure conference key can also be established by using
several bipartite QKD links. Bipartite quantum links
are already being implemented in small quantum net-
works over metropolitan distances [24–29] and in larger
networks spanning entire countries [30–32]. The long-
term vision of a general quantum network, however, goes
beyond mere bipartite links and includes network nodes
that process quantum information, thus enabling the dis-
tribution of multipartite entangled states across the net-
work [33]. In a quantum network, quantum communica-
tion with genuine multipartite entangled states may offer
advantages over the bipartite case [34], and allow secure
interactions between an arbitrary subset of the partici-
pating partners.
The rich structure of multipartite entangled quantum
states opens the possibility for a wide variety of new key
distribution protocols. While protocols for CKA based
merely on bipartite QKD do not bring much novelty
in terms of the necessary quantum technologies or the
theoretical tools required for the security analysis, this
changes when protocols explore multipartite entangle-
ment. Here, quantum correlations can be exploited to
devise truly multipartite schemes. This is the focus of
this paper, namely we will review the proposals and de-
velopments regarding the use of multipartite quantum
entanglement for the establishment of a conference key.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Multipartite entangled resources
Multipartite quantum states have a more convoluted
structure than the bipartite ones [35–38]. Different
classes of states can be defined according to their entan-
glement properties, and concepts such as k-separability
and genuine multipartite entanglement arise (for a pre-
cise definition of these concepts, see [35, 36, 38]). For
multipartite systems, there exist different entanglement
classes that are not equivalent under stochastic local op-
erations and classical communication (SLOCC) [38–40].
In particular, in the tripartite case [39], two nonequiv-
alent classes of genuinely multipartite entangled states
can be defined: the GHZ-class represented by the Green-
berger–Horne–Zeilinger (GHZ) state [41]
|GHZ〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉) , (1)
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2and the W-class represented by the W state [39]
|W〉 = 1√
3
(|001〉+ |010〉+ |100〉) . (2)
These classes of states also exhibit different physical
properties. The GHZ-state is a direct generalization of
Bell states to the multipartite case and maximally vi-
olates the well-studied family of N -party Bell inequali-
ties called MABK [42–44]. However, the entanglement
present in the GHZ-state is not robust to particle losses,
while the W-state still exhibits bipartite entanglement
when one particle is lost.
The 3-party GHZ and W states in Eqs. (1) and (2)
can be generalized in a straightforward way to N par-
ties. They constitute the resources for quantum CKA
protocols discussed in the following sections.
B. Security
1. Security definition
We consider N users, Alice, Bob1, Bob2, . . . , BobN−1.
The users wish to establish a common string of bits that
is unknown to any other party, in particular to any po-
tential eavesdropper.
The security of a quantum conference key agreement
protocol is based on two conditions: correctness and
secrecy.
Definition 1 (Correctness). A CKA protocol is corr-
correct if
p(KA = KB1 = . . . = KBN−1) ≥ 1− corr, (3)
where KA, KBi are the final keys held by Alice and Bobi
and p(KA = KB1 = . . . = KBN−1) is the probability that
all final keys are identical.
Definition 2 (Secrecy). A CKA protocol is sec-secret
if, for Ω being the event that the protocol does not abort,
p(Ω)
1
2
‖ρKAE|Ω − τKA ⊗ ρE‖ ≤ sec, (4)
where p(Ω) is the probability of the event Ω, τKA =
1
|S|
∑
si∈S |si〉〈si | is the maximally mixed state over all
possible values that the key KA can assume, and S =
{0, 1}×`, where ` is the length of the key KA.
Correctness implies that, at the end of the protocol,
Alice and the Bobs share the same string of bits except for
probability at most corr. The secrecy requirement states
that Alice’s key is randomly chosen among the set of
possible strings and the eavesdropper has no information
about the key, except for probability at most sec. If a
CKA protocol is corr-correct and sec-secret, then it is
said to be s-correct-and-secret for all s ≥ corr + sec.
Additionally, a useful CKA protocol should have a ro-
bust honest implementation. This is captured by the
concept of completeness.
Definition 3 (Completeness). A quantum CKA protocol
is c-complete if there exists an honest implementation of
the protocol, such that the probability of not aborting is
greater than 1− c.
Finally, the security of a quantum CKA protocol can
be summarized as [45]:
Definition 4 (Security of a quantum CKA protocol). A
quantum CKA protocol is (s, c)-secure if
(I) (Soundness) For any implementation of the proto-
col, it is s-correct-and-secret.
(II) (Completeness) There exists an honest implemen-
tation of the protocol, such that the probability of
not aborting is greater than 1− c.
Definition 4 implies composable security [45–47]. This
means that the conference key generated by a protocol
satisfying the conditions stated in Definition 4 is compos-
able secure and therefore can be used as a building block
for further protocols (this, however, cannot always be in-
ferred in the device-independent scenario, see Remark 1
in Section V).
The quantum left-over hashing lemma [48, 49] estab-
lishes that a secret conference key can be obtained if the
key length ` is slightly shorter than
` . Hmin(An1 |E) (5)
where Hmin(A
n
1 |E) is the conditional smooth min-
entropy [50] evaluated for the classical-quantum (cq)
state ρAn1E composed of Alice’s raw key of size n and the
quantum side information of a potential eavesdropper.
The conditional smooth min-entropy of a cq-state ρAE
is defined as
Hmin(A|E) = sup
ρ˜AE∈B(ρAE)
Hmin(A|E), (6)
where  ∈ [0, 1), and the supremum is taken over positive
sub-normalized operators that are -close to ρAE in the
purifying distance [50]. And the conditional min-entropy,
Hmin(A|E), of a classical variable A conditioned on the
quantum side information E is closely related to the op-
timal probability of the eavesdropper guessing the value
of A, pguess(A|E), [51]
Hmin(A|E) = − log pguess(A|E). (7)
For a precise definition and properties of entropic quan-
tities we refer the reader to [50].
The main task in the security proof of a conference key
agreement protocol is to estimateHmin(A
n
1 |E). Note that
this is very similar to the bipartite case of quantum key
distribution. In fact, the secrecy condition only depends
on the correlations between the eavesdropper and Alice’s
string. However, in the multipartite scenario the parties
need to ensure that all of the Bobs correct their raw key
so that the correctness requirement is satisfied.
32. Security model
In the scenario where N parties wish to securely com-
municate, the adversary is an external party, Eve, who
can eavesdrop on all the exchanged public communica-
tion. Moreover, Eve might try to tamper with the quan-
tum channels and explore correlations with the generated
conference key.
Similar to the bipartite case, we can also classify the
attacks performed by the eavesdropper into three cate-
gories:
1. Individual attacks: the eavesdropper can only at-
tack individually each round of the protocol. In
this case she is assumed to have no quantum mem-
ory, and therefore her best strategy is to perform a
measurement on her quantum side information at
each round.
2. Collective attacks: Eve is assumed to perform the
same attack for each round of the protocol, that
is, her quantum side information is identically and
independently distributed (IID) with respect to dif-
ferent rounds. Differently from individual attacks,
Eve is now assumed to have a quantum memory.
Therefore, she can store her quantum side informa-
tion at each round and perform a global operation
on it at the end of the execution of the protocol.
3. Coherent attacks: This is the most general type
of attack where there are no assumptions on the
capabilities of the eavesdropper, except that she is
bounded by the laws of quantum mechanics. In this
case the states shared by the parties at each round
may have arbitrary correlations with previous and
future rounds.
C. Generic Protocols
The goal of quantum conference key agreement is that
the N users make use of their shared quantum resources
together with local operations and public communication
in order to establish a secure conference key.
In the following section we will present the proposed
quantum protocols that perform the task of CKA, mak-
ing use of multipartite entanglement. The protocols we
will discuss consist of the following main steps:
1. Preparation and distribution: A source dis-
tributes a multipartite entangled state to the N
parties. This step is repeated n times.
2. Measurements: Upon receiving the systems, the
parties perform local measurements and record the
classical outcome. The measurements are randomly
chosen according to the specifications of the proto-
col. One of the possible measurement settings is
used with higher probability and is called the key
generation measurement. The other measurements
are used for test rounds, which only occasionally
occur.
3. Parameter estimation: The parties announce
the inputs and outputs of their test rounds and of
some randomly chosen key generation rounds which
are used to estimate their correlation and the po-
tential influence of an eavesdropper. At the end of
this step each party is left with a string of nraw < n
bits, which constitute their raw key.
4. Information reconciliation (error correc-
tion): The parties publicly exchange classical in-
formation in order for the Bobs to correct their
string of bits to match Alice’s string. In the multi-
partite case, the information reconciliation protocol
needs to account for the correction of the strings of
all the Bobs.
5. Privacy amplification: Alice randomly picks a
hash function, chosen among a two-universal family
of hash functions (see [48]), and communicates it to
the Bobs. Every party applies the hash function to
turn her/his partially secure string of nraw bits into
a secure key of ` < nraw bits.
The key rate of a protocol is given by
r = τ
`
n
(8)
where τ is the repetition rate of the setup, i.e. the inverse
of the time it takes to implement one round of prepara-
tion and measurement of the quantum systems. In the
following sections we will typically take τ = 1 as we will
not be focused on any specific experimental implementa-
tion. The key rate in the limit of infinitely many rounds,
n → ∞, is called the asymptotic key rate and denoted
r∞.
III. PROTOCOLS FOR MULTY-QUBIT STATES
A. GHZ state protocols
The first proposals of quantum conference key agree-
ment protocols explore the multipartite correlations ex-
hibited by the N -party GHZ state:
|GHZN 〉 = 1√
2
(|00 . . . 0〉+ |11 . . . 1〉) , (9)
where {|0〉, |1〉} is the Z-basis, composed by the eigen-
states of the Pauli operator σz. The GHZ state satis-
fies all the desired conditions for a conference key agree-
ment protocol: the outcomes of measurements in the Z-
basis are perfectly correlated, random and uniformly dis-
tributed. Interestingly, for N ≥ 3 this perfect correlation
can only be achieved if all the parties measure in the Z-
basis. As shown in [34], even bipartite perfect correlation
4cannot be obtained if the parties choose a different ba-
sis. This represents a drastic difference from the bipartite
case (N = 2). Indeed, if Alice and Bob share the max-
imally entangled state |Φ〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉), for each
choice of local basis for Alice, there exists a local basis
for Bob such that their outcomes exhibit perfect correla-
tion. This property is exploited in the bipartite six-state
[52] and BB84 [1] protocols for QKD.
Early proposals of protocols that employ the GHZ
state to establish a conference key between three par-
ties were presented in [53]. Security is proved, against
individual attacks, for the ideal case where Alice can pre-
pare and distribute perfect GHZ states. Robustness to
noise is not considered. In Ref. [54], Chen and Lo proved
the security of quantum conference key agreement based
on the distillation of GHZ states [55, 56]. They derive
distillation rates for a protocol based on a improved ver-
sion of the multi-party hashing method [55]. These rates
correspond to conference key rates, due to the fact that
the multi-party hashing distillation protocol [55] can be
implemented by classical post-processing of the raw key.
Ref. [54] also considers distillation rates when recurrence
protocols are applied before the multi-party hashing. Re-
currence protocols are based on CSS codes [57, 58] and,
if certain conditions are met, they can also be translated
to a classical post-processing of the generated raw keys,
in a similar fashion to the bipartite case [59]. Ref. [54]
modifies the recurrence protocol introduced in [56], using
ideas of [59], to design a protocol that can be converted
to classical post-processing of the raw key. This type of
classical post-processing of the raw key requires two-way
communication and was denoted advantage distillation
[60–62].
In the following subsections, we present specific proto-
cols with GHZ states that can be regarded as the gener-
alization of the six-state and the BB84 protocols to the
multipartite case.
1. Multiparty six-state protocol
The quantum conference key agreement protocol in-
troduced in [34] can be seen as a generalization of the
six-state QKD protocol [52] to the multipartite case. In-
deed, in Ref. [34] the parties perform measurements in
the three bases {X,Y, Z}. Measurements in the Z-basis
are used with higher frequency, and they constitute the
key generation rounds. The X-basis and Y -basis are in-
stead used in fewer rounds, specifically in the test rounds,
in order to estimate the information available to a poten-
tial eavesdropper.
From the parameter estimation rounds, the statistics
of the Z-measurements is used to estimate the qubit er-
ror rates (QBERs) and thus to determine the informa-
tion that needs to be communicated by Alice for infor-
mation reconciliation. The bipartite QBERs, QABi , for
1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1, are the probabilities that the outcome
of a Z-measurement by Bobi disagrees with Alice’s Z-
measurement outcome. In the multipartite scenario we
can also define the total QBER QZ as the probability
that at least one Bob obtains an outcome different than
Alice. If the N parties share a state ρ, the QBER QZ is
given by
QZ = 1− tr
(
ρ
(|0〉〈0|⊗N + |1〉〈1|⊗N)) . (10)
With the statistics of the test rounds, the parties want to
estimate the expected value of the operator X⊗N . Since
the multipartite GHZ state does not exhibit perfect cor-
relation in more than one basis [34], the QBER QX is
defined as the probability that the X⊗N -measurement
gives a result that differs from the ideal case:
QX =
1− 〈X⊗N 〉
2
. (11)
Note that if the parties share the GHZ state (9), then
the corresponding QX is zero.
A crucial step in the security analysis of the protocol
presented in Ref. [34] is a reduction to depolarized states.
An N -qubit depolarized state is a state of the form:
ρdep = λ0,~0|Ψ0,~0〉〈Ψ0,~0 |+ λ1,~0|Ψ1,~0〉〈Ψ1,~0 |
+
∑
σ,~u 6=~0
λ~u|Ψσ,~u〉〈Ψσ,~u |, (12)
where
|ψσ,~u〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉|~u〉+ (−1)σ|1〉|~¯u〉) (13)
for ~u ∈ {0, 1}×(N−1), ~¯u = ~u ⊕ ~1, and σ ∈ {0, 1}. The
states {|ψσ,~u〉}σ,~u form a basis, denoted as the GHZ basis.
The depolarized GHZ state is then diagonal in the GHZ
basis and such that λ0,~u = λ1,~u ≡ λ~u for ~u 6= ~0.
For a state of the form (12), one finds that
QZ(ρdep) = 1− (λ0,~0 + λ1,~0), (14)
and
QX(ρdep) =
1− (λ0,~0 − λ1,~0)
2
. (15)
Finally, the asymptotic key rate for the depolarized
state (12) is given as a function of QX , QZ and the bi-
partite QBERs QABi [34]:
r∞ =(1−QZ) (1− log(1−QZ))
+
(
1− QZ
2
−QX
)
log
(
1− QZ
2
−QX
)
+
(
QX − QZ
2
)
log
(
QX − QZ
2
)
− max
1≤i≤N−1
h (QABi)
. (16)
For the generality of the security analysis of [34], it
remains to argue that the reduction to depolarized states,
5(12), is not restrictive. Any N -qubit state can be brought
to the form (12) by successive application of the following
set of local operations [63, 64]
D = {X⊗N} ∪ {ZABj |1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1}
∪ {Rk|1 ≤ k ≤ N − 1}
, (17)
where the operations ZABj and Rk are defined as
ZABj = ZA ⊗ ZBj ⊗ IB[N−1]\j (18)
and
Rk = diag(1, i)A ⊗ diag(1,−i)Bk ⊗ IB[N−1]\k . (19)
Indeed, the application of the map
ρ 7→ ρ˜ = ◦2N−1i=1 Di[ρ] (20)
where
Di[ρ] = 1
2
ρ+
1
2
DiρD
†
i ; Di ∈ D, (21)
brings any N -qubit state to the form (12).
A crucial observation is that the map (20) can be im-
plemented in the protocol by flipping the outcomes of
some of the measurements and adding additional mea-
surements in the Y -basis [34].
Consider first the set of operations
{
X⊗N
} ∪{
ZABj |1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1
}
. Successive application of these
operations brings any N -qubit state to the GHZ-diagonal
form
ρ˜ =
∑
σ,~u
λσ,~u|ψσ,~u〉〈ψσ,~u |. (22)
For the key generation rounds, in which Alice and the
Bobs measure in the Z-basis, the application of ZABj
does not have any effect on the final outcomes and the
operation X⊗N can be equivalently applied by Alice and
the Bobs by flipping their Z-measurement outcomes. For
the estimation of X⊗N in the test rounds, the operations{
X⊗N
} ∪ {ZABj |1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1} have no effect, as can
be seen by the fact that they commute with X⊗N .
The application of the operations {Rk} is what finally
brings the state to the depolarized form (12). They have
no effect on the key generation rounds as they do not
change the outcome of the Z-measurements. For the test
rounds, the action of Rk is more subtle. As shown in
[34], the action of Rk followed by a measurement in the
X-basis is equivalently implemented by Bobk performing
a Y -basis measurement. Therefore the action of the op-
erators {Rk}, which are essential to simplify the security
analysis of the protocol introduced [34], can be imple-
mented in the protocol by adding Y -basis measurements
to the test rounds.
In Ref. [34] the authors show that in a quantum net-
work with quantum routers, for a bottleneck configura-
tion with constrained channel capacity, the multipartite
six-state protocol based on the GHZ state leads to higher
rates as compared to several implementations of bipartite
QKD, when the gate quality is above certain threshold
value.
A security analysis of the multiparty six-state protocol
against coherent attacks taking into account finite size
effects was presented in [65].
2. Multiparty BB84 protocol
In Ref. [65], also a multipartite version of the BB84
protocol was introduced: here, the parties only need to
perform measurements in two bases, the Z-basis and the
X-basis. The security analysis is based on the uncer-
tainty relation for smooth entropies [66]. This technique
has previously been used in the bipartite case [3, 5] for the
security proof of the BB84 protocol in the finite regime
for parameters that are compatible with current technol-
ogy. The uncertainty relation establishes that for a pure
state |ψA~BE〉, if Alice can perform measurements in two
bases, say theX-basis and the Z-basis, then the following
relation is satisfied:
Hmin(Z
m
1 |E) ≤ q −Hmax(Xm1 |B1 . . . BN−1) (23)
where the conditional smooth min-entropy on the l.h.s. is
evaluated for the cq-state shared by Alice and Eve when
Alice measures her systems in the Z-basis, and the con-
ditional smooth max-entropy on the r.h.s. is evaluated
for the cq-state shared by Alice and the Bobs when Al-
ice measures her systems in the X-basis. For a precise
definition of Hmax we refer the reader to [50]. The term
q quantifies the incompatibility of the two measurements
used by Alice, and for the case where Alice can measure
X or Z the quality factor q for them rounds will be equal
to m.
The quantityHmax(Xm1 |B1 . . . BN−1) can be estimated
by using the X-measurements performed by the Bobs
(11). Indeed, the data processing inequality guarantees
that
Hmax(X
m
1 |B1 . . . BN−1) ≤ Hmax(Xm1 | ~Xn1 ), (24)
where ~Xm1 contains the X-outcomes of every Bob, had
the Bobs measured in the X-basis in the m rounds.
Clearly the entropy on the r.h.s. of Eq. (24), that is
the entropy of Alice’s X-outcome string given the X-
outcome strings of the Bobs, can be estimated via the
X-basis error defined in Eq. (11).
Finally Ref. [65] establishes the asymptotic secret key
rate of the multiparty BB84 protocol
r∞ = 1− h(QX)− max
1≤i≤N−1
h(QABi). (25)
3. Comparison of multiparty six-state and BB84 protocols
For any specific implementation, the asymptotic key
rates obtained by the multiparty six-state protocol [34]
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Figure 1. Asymptotic secret key rates of the multipartite six-
state (solid) [34] and BB84 (dashed) [65] protocols as a func-
tion of the bipartite QBER between Alice and any Bob, for a
local depolarizing noise model. The rates are plotted for dif-
ferent numbers of parties (N = 2, 5, 8, right to left). The plot
shows that the multipartite six-state protocol asymptotically
outperforms the multipartite BB84 protocol.
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Figure 2. Secret key rates of the multipartite six-state (solid)
[34] and BB84 (dashed) [65] protocols as a function of the total
number of roundsM , for different number of parties (N = 2, 5
and 8, left to right) and fixed bipartite QBER (QABi = 0.03).
The noise model employed is the local depolarizing channel
given in Eqs.(26) and (27). A non-null conference key can be
obtained for fewer rounds with the multipartite BB84 proto-
col, compared to the multipartite six-state protocol, and the
advantage of the former protocol increases with the number
of parties.
are higher than those obtained by the multiparty BB84
[65]. This is because more structure can be ensured about
the underlying state in the protocol presented in [34]. For
instance, consider the implementation where Alice pre-
pares a GHZ state and distributes it to each of the Bobs
using a qubit depolarizing channel. The state shared by
the parties is thus
ρA~B = D⊗(N−1)2 |GHZN 〉〈GHZN |, (26)
where
D2(ρ) = (1− ν)ρ+ ν 1
2
. (27)
Fig. 1 shows the comparison of the asymptotic key rates
achieved by the two multiparty protocols (N = 2, 5, 8)
in the specific implementation given by the noise model
in Eq. (26). The key rates are plotted as a function of
the bipartite QBER between Alice and any Bob, which
turns out to be a simple function of the noise parameter
characterizing the depolarizing channel: QABi = ν/2.
The figure confirms that, asymptotically, the multipartite
six-state protocol [34] overcomes the multipartite BB84
[65] in terms of performance.
Ref. [65] also performs a complete security analysis
in the finite-key regime for the multiparty six-state and
multiparty BB84 protocol. Regarding the rates in the
finite-key regime, it was shown that, even though the
six-state protocol can tolerate higher noise, for the low-
noise regime a non-zero conference key rate can be proven
for the multiparty BB84 protocol using a significantly
smaller number of rounds. This is confirmed by Fig. 2,
where the secret key rates of both protocols are plotted
as a function of the total number of protocol rounds, hav-
ing fixed the bipartite QBER. The noise model employed
is the same used for Fig. 1, i.e. the local depolarizing
channel given in Eq. (27). It is important to remark that
the lower threshold on the minimum number of signals
for a non-zero key by the multiparty BB84 protocol, may
be simply due to the techniques used to compute the
key rates. The finite-key rates of the multipartite six-
state are derived using the post-selection technique [67]
in combination with the finite version of the asymptotic
equipartition property [68] (see also [48]). These tech-
niques might lead to higher overhead terms in the finite-
key regime and therefore to a less tight estimate than
what can be obtained using the uncertainty relation for
smooth entropies [66]. However, due to the fact that in
the multiparty six-state protocol the parties are required
to perform three distinct measurements, the uncertainty
relation is not applicable.
4. Prepare-and-measure implementation
Even though entanglement plays an essential role
for the security of bipartite QKD, it is known that
some QKD protocols have a corresponding prepare-and-
measure implementation that does not require any en-
tanglement. The BB84 protocol, for example, can be
implemented with Alice transmitting single qubit states
to Bob.
Similarly, in the multipartite case we can also talk
about a corresponding prepare-and-measure implementa-
tion. However, now this reduction will require the prepa-
ration of some (N − 1)-entangled states [34].
Indeed for the key generation rounds, in which the
parties are performing measurements in the Z-basis, Al-
ice could instead randomly choose her bit and prepare
7(N − 1) copies of the corresponding single qubit state
to send to the Bobs, |0〉⊗(N−1) or |1〉⊗(N−1). Although
entanglement is not required to reproduce the statistics
of the key generation rounds, the corresponding state
shared by the Bobs when Alice performs a measurement
in the X-basis or Y -basis is entangled. Therefore, for
the test rounds, Alice is required to prepare an (N − 1)-
entangled state.
For example, when Alice performs an X-measurement,
given that she obtains the outcome a, the corresponding
state that she has to distribute to the Bobs is the (N−1)-
entangled state:
|ψa〉B1...BN−1 =
1√
2
(|00 . . . 0〉+ (−1)a|11 . . . 1〉) . (28)
The prepare-and-measure equivalence significantly re-
duces the resources required for the implementation of
the protocols [34, 65], as Alice needs to control (N − 1)-
partite entanglement instead of N -partite entanglement.
This can have significant practical implications especially
in the noisy intermediate scale (NISQ) era [69]. More-
over, it is important to remark that, for most of the
rounds, the key generation rounds, Alice can in fact pre-
pare product states, and entanglement is only required
in a small fraction of the rounds for the purpose of pa-
rameter estimation.
A prepare-and-measure protocol in which Alice only
needs to send separable states was proved secure for the
case N = 3 in [70]. However, when extending the pro-
tocol to an arbitrary number of parties N the states dis-
tributed by Alice would become increasingly distinguish-
able as N increases, which would allow an eavesdropper
to retrieve more information about the key, while caus-
ing less disturbance. Thus, the secret key rate would
decrease with increasing N , even for a perfect implemen-
tation.
B. W state protocol
Quantum conference key agreement does not necessar-
ily need to rely on the correlations provided by multi-
partite GHZ states. Indeed, the protocol devised in [71]
exploits the multipartite entanglement of a W-class state
in order to establish a conference key. The W state of N
parties is defined as
|WN 〉 = 1√
N
(|0 . . . 01〉+ |0 . . . 10〉+ . . .+ |1 . . . 00〉) ,
(29)
whereas a W-class state has a similar form to (29) but
presents arbitrary phases on each term.
In the conference key agreement protocol of Ref. [71],
the state is post-selected thanks to single-photon inter-
ference occurring in a central untrusted node, extending
the founding idea of twin-field QKD [72, 73] to the mul-
tipartite scenario.
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Figure 3. Comparison of the asymptotic conference key rate
achieved by the W state protocol [71] (solid) and by the N-
BB84 protocol [65] (dashed, the N-six-state protocol rate is
identical in this ideal scenario) as a function of the loss in
the channel linking each party to the central entanglement
distributor, for different number of parties (N = 2, 5 and 10).
We assume ideal implementations where the only source of
error is photon loss and where the GHZ state of the N-BB84
(N-six-state) protocol is encoded in orthogonal polarizations
of a photon.
In particular, each round of the protocol starts with
partyi (i = 1, 2, . . . , N) preparing the following entangled
state between an optical pulse ai and a qubit Ai:
|φ〉Aiai =
√
q|0〉Ai |0〉ai +
√
1− q|1〉Ai |1〉ai , (30)
where |0〉ai is the vacuum state, |1〉ai is the single-photon
state, and {|0〉Ai , |1〉Ai} is the computational basis of the
qubit. The state is strongly unbalanced towards the vac-
uum: q ≈ 1. Every party sends his/her optical pulse to
a central untrusted node through a lossy optical channel.
Here, the pulses are combined in a balanced multiport
beam splitter [74] featuring a threshold detector at ev-
ery output port. The central node announces whether
each detector clicked or not and the parties only keep the
rounds where exactly one detector clicked. These events
are likely to be caused by the arrival and detection of just
one photon, due to the unbalance towards the vacuum of
the prepared state (30). Because of the balanced super-
position generated by the multiport beam splitter, the
detected photon could be sent by any party with equal
probability. Thus, the main contribution to the N -qubit
state shared by the parties conditioned on the single de-
tection is a coherent superposition of states in which one
qubit is in state |1〉 and all the others are in state |0〉,
that is the mentioned W -class state. The qubits’ relative
coefficients have all equal weights but contain complex
phases introduced by the multiport beam splitter.
It has been proven that the only multiqubit state yield-
ing perfectly correlated and random outcomes upon per-
forming local measurements is the GHZ state [34]. Nev-
ertheless, the post-selectedW -class state can still be used
to distil a conference key. More specifically, the parties
obtain the key bits by measuring their qubit in a spe-
cific direction in the X-Y plane of the Bloch sphere. The
8direction is the one that minimizes the bipartite QBER
and depends on which detector clicked. For this reason,
the protocol cannot be recast as a prepare-and-measure
scheme, unlike its bipartite counterpart [73]. Finally, the
parties estimate the eavesdropper’s knowledge by com-
puting the expectation value of the Z⊗N operator and
by checking when it differs from the ideal case. Note
that if the parties are actually sharing a W -class state,
then 〈Z⊗N 〉 = −1.
In [71] the security of the protocol is proved in the
finite-key regime and under coherent attacks performed
by the eavesdropper.
The W -class N -qubit state on which the protocol is
based is post-selected thanks to single-photon interfer-
ence at the central node. Hence, the resulting key rate
scales linearly with the transmittance t of one of the
quantum channels linking each party to the central node
(if the channels are all symmetric). This contrasts with
the honest implementations of the protocols [34, 65] pre-
sented in subsection IIIA, which are based on the dis-
tribution of N -qubit GHZ states. If these states are en-
coded, e.g., in the orthogonal polarizations of a photon,
their key rate cannot scale better than tN , where t is the
transmittance of the link between one party and the cen-
tral distributor of the N -partite entangled state. This
makes the protocol based on the W state much more
suited to high-loss scenarios than the protocols of sub-
section IIIA. This is clear from Fig. 3, where we plot the
asymptotic conference key rates of protocols [71] (solid
lines) and [34, 65] (dashed lines) as a function of the loss
in the quantum channel linking one party to the cen-
tral node (−10 log10 t). We assume ideal implementa-
tions where photon loss is the only source of error. We
observe the existence of a loss threshold above which the
protocol based on the W state [71] outperforms the pro-
tocols based on the distribution of GHZ states [34, 65].
Moreover, the required loss for which the protocol [71]
outperforms the protocols [34, 65] decreases as the num-
ber of parties involved increases.
IV. CONTINUOUS VARIABLE CONFERENCE
KEY AGREEMENT
Quantum conference keys may also be established by
means of continuous variable (CV) quantum systems.
Following the first of such protocols [75], which enables
quantum conferencing among three parties without trust-
ing the measurement devices, more general and refined
protocols [76, 77] have been devised. The latter allow
an arbitrary number of users to establish conference keys
when linked to a central untrusted relay in a star net-
work. These schemes would allow high-rate intra-city
secure conferencing among several users.
Both protocols [76, 77] rely on the correlations gener-
ated by an N -mode CV GHZ state [78]:
|CVGHZ〉N = 1√
pi
∫ ∞
−∞
dx|x〉⊗N , (31)
where {|x〉}x are the eigenstates of the Xˆ quadrature.
However, while in [77] the central relay is required to
generate such multipartite entangled state, in [76] the
state is post-selected thanks to a multipartite CV Bell
detection at the central relay. In particular, in [76] every
user prepares a Gaussian-modulated coherent state |αk〉
(k = 1, . . . N) and sends it to the central relay. Here,
a suitable cascade of beam splitters followed by homo-
dyne detections of either quadrature Xˆ or quadrature
Pˆ implement the multipartite Bell detection, whose out-
come is made public. The Bell detection projects the
incoming coherent states onto the CV GHZ state (31)
up to displacements of the N modes. By employing
the public data of the Bell detection, the parties post-
process the variables {αk}Nk=1 describing the prepared
coherent states and neutralize the effect of the displace-
ments. They are thus left with variables whose corre-
lations reproduce those of the original CV GHZ state
(31) and hence can be used to distil a conference key.
This procedure closely resembles the seminal work on
measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD with dis-
crete variables [79] and its CV counterpart [80], now ap-
plied to a multipartite scenario. Indeed, the fact that
the measurements are only performed by the untrusted
relay, makes the protocol in [76] an MDI multipartite
QKD protocol. Nevertheless, its performance does not
decrease exponentially with the number of users since
the CV Bell detection is a deterministic process, unlike
its discrete-variable counterpart [79].
Note that, unlike the discrete-variable scenario, here
the correlated variables {αk}Nk=1 used to distil a binary
key are complex numbers. Nevertheless, one can still ex-
press the resulting key rate in terms of their mutual infor-
mation I(αk, αk′) with the well-known Devetak-Winter
formula [81], which is assumed to hold also for CV-QKD
[82].
Compared to [76], the protocol in [77] is not MDI since
the multipartite GHZ state generated in the untrusted re-
lay is then distributed to the parties who perform trusted
measurements. Moreover, from a practical point of view,
this scheme is harder to implement, as it involves the
preparation of several optical modes in squeezed states
and their subsequent entanglement in a specific target
state. Nevertheless, in principle, the scheme in [77] could
achieve slightly higher performances than the more prac-
tical protocol in [76].
In terms of security, both protocols [76, 77] have been
proved to be secure against collective Gaussian attacks.
Furthermore, the protocol in [76] has been analyzed
in the framework of finite-key composable security and
proven to be secure against coherent attacks through a
Gaussian de Finetti reduction [83].
9V. DEVICE-INDEPENDENT CONFERENCE
KEY AGREEMENT
In the device-independent scenario, Alice and the Bobs
do not want to assume any knowledge about the dis-
tributed system and internal working of their devices. It
is even considered that the shared states as well as the
measurement devices can be manufactured by the adver-
sary [84]. The parties’ goal is to ensure security using
only the observed statistics of inputs and outputs. In a
device-independent protocol security is certified by the
violation of a Bell inequality.
Note that in a device-independent conference key
agreement (DICKA) protocol, an analysis against coher-
ent attacks also needs to account for the fact that the
eavesdropper might program the devices to behave in
different ways at each round of the protocol. In particu-
lar the measurement devices could have memory and be-
have in correlation with the outcomes of previous rounds.
This makes the security analysis in the fully device-
independent adversarial scenario significantly more in-
tricate.
A recently developed technique [8, 85], the entropy ac-
cumulation theorem (EAT), provides the tools to perform
the security analysis of device-independent protocols in
the fully adversarial scenario maintaining some noise ro-
bustness. The EAT [8, 85] extends the de Finnetti theo-
rems [67, 86] to the device-independent setting, allowing
to reduce the analysis to collective attacks.
Remark 1. (Composability in the device-independent
scenario) The security definition, Definition 4, implies
universal composability of conference key agreement in
the trusted device scenario. However, for the device-
independent scenario, attacks proposed in Ref. [87] show
that composability cannot be guaranteed if the same de-
vices are re-used in a subsequent protocol. Indeed, in
Ref. [87] the authors describe attacks in which infor-
mation about a previously generated key may be leaked
through the public communication of a subsequent run
of the protocol, if the devices are re-used. The attacks
described in Ref. [87] can be avoided if the parties have
sufficient control of the internal memory of their devices
and are able to re-set it after one execution of the proto-
col.
Based on the EAT, a DICKA protocol was proposed
in [88, 89]. The protocol of Ref. [88] initially consid-
ers the multipartite Mermin-Ardehali-Belinskii-Klyshko
(MABK) inequalities [42–44]. However, as shown in [90],
the MABK inequalities are not suitable for establishing
a conference key, as an overhead amount of information
is required for information reconciliation. In Ref. [89], a
new multiparty inequality is introduced and positive con-
ference key can be established in the device-independent
scenario. Fig. 4 shows the asymptotic key rates for the
device-independent protocol of Ref. [89] for N = 3, 5, 8,
for an implementation in which all the qubits are sub-
mitted to a depolarizing channel.
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Figure 4. Asymptotic secret key rate for the DICKA protocol
of Ref. [89] as a function of the QBER and for fixed num-
ber of parties (N = 3, 5, 8). We assumed an implementation
where the N -party GHZ state is submitted to the depolarizing
channel D⊗N2 (|GHZN 〉〈GHZN |).
The key rates derived in [89] are based on an analytical
lower bound to von Neumann entropy of Alice’s outcome
conditioned on the information available to the eaves-
dropper, H(A|E), as a function of the violation of the
Bell inequality under consideration. The bound employs
a relation between the considered multipartite inequality
and the bipartite Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH)
inequality [10].
In general, it is not possible to compute directly
H(A|E) as a function of the violation for an arbitrary
Bell inequality. This is due to the lack of knowledge
about the underlying system. A lower bound can be ob-
tained using the relation H(A|E) ≥ Hmin(A|E), where
Hmin(A|E) is the conditional min-entropy defined in (7).
Due to the relation with the guessing probability, (7), the
conditional min-entropy, Hmin(A|E), can be estimated
in the device-independent scenario [91] using the hierar-
chy of semi-definite approximations to the quantum set
[92, 93]. This method is, however, computationally costly
and may lead to non-tight bounds.
Bell inequalities tailored to DICKA protocols were fur-
ther investigated in [94], where the authors introduced a
family of multipartite Bell inequalities (containing the
inequality of [89] as a special case) that are maximally
violated by the GHZ state, with the Z-basis being one
of the optimal measurements for Alice. These are essen-
tial features to build a device-independent conference key
agreement protocol.
It is interesting to remark that the MABK inequalities
were previously explored in other multiparty communi-
cation protocols. Refs. [95, 96] consider a secret sharing
scenario in which Alice distributes the key in such a way
that the N − 1 Bobs need to collaborate to retrieve its
value. The authors establish that, if the eavesdropper is
restricted to individual attacks, then the violation of a
MABK inequality can guarantee security, even if some of
the Bobs collaborate with Eve. Even though this scenario
was initially denoted N -party QKD [95, 96], it should be
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distiguished from the scenario we consider in this review:
in which the goal is that all the Bobs can retrieve the key
independently.
VI. MULTIPARTITE PRIVATE STATES
Most of the quantum conference key agreement pro-
tocols presented in the previous sections exploit the cor-
relations of the multipartite GHZ state (9). Therefore,
GHZ distillation protocols are in close connection with
distillation of secret conference keys. Indeed, if the par-
ties share several copies of a resource state that can be
turned into a smaller number of GHZ states, then they
could perform a distillation protocol followed by mea-
surements to generate a secret key. The connection of
entanglement distillation and conference key agreement
protocols is discussed in [54]. Ref. [97], has recently in-
vestigated the limits on the performance of GHZ state
distribution in a network, with and without quantum re-
peaters, and its consequence for CKA protocols based on
the GHZ state.
However, it is not only through distillation of GHZ
states that one can obtain a secret key. Indeed, as shown
in [98], an -secure conference key can also be obtained
from bound entangled states. This result generalizes an
analogous one derived in the bipartite case [99].
The concept of private states [100] was generalized to
the multipartite case in Ref. [98, 101]. Similar to the
bipartite case, a multipartite private state can be seen
as a twisted GHZ state tensored with an extra density
matrix (the shield)
Γ
(d)
A~BA′
= Ut(|GHZdN 〉〈GHZdN | ⊗ ρA′)U†t , (32)
where |GHZdN 〉 = 1√d
∑d−1
i=0 |ii . . . i〉 is the N -party GHZ
state of dimension d and the multipartite twisting is a
unitary operation of the form
Ut =
d−1∑
i1,...,iN=0
|i1 . . . iN 〉〈i1 . . . iN | ⊗ Ui1,...,iN (33)
for arbitrary unitaries Ui1,...,iN acting on A′.
Ref. [98] establishes that if from a resource state Alice
and the Bobs can distill an -secret conference key, then
there exists an LOCC protocol that can distill a state
close to a private state (32) and vice-versa. They also
exhibit examples of multipartite bound entangled states,
that are states from which a GHZ state cannot be dis-
tilled, which are -close to private states. This establishes
that distillation of GHZ states is not necessary for quan-
tum conference key agreement and more general classes
of protocols are possible.
In the framework of quantum channels and private
state distillation, converse bounds on the rate at which a
secret key can be distilled using multiplex channels were
recently provided in [102]. Ref. [102] establishes that
genuine multipartite entanglement is necessary for single
shot key distillation. This implies that, if key can be dis-
tilled from n copies of a multipartite state ρ, then ρ⊗n
needs to be genuine multipartite entangled. However,
this does not require that genuine multipartite entangle-
ment is present at the single round level ρ. Indeed, a
study of the entanglement properties required for a re-
source state to enable a conference key was recently per-
formed in [103]. Results of Ref. [103] show that a con-
ference key can be established even if the parties share a
biseparable state in every round.
VII. OUTLOOK
We reviewed the state-of-the-art quantum CKA
schemes based on multipartite entanglement. We dis-
cussed proposed protocols and their security proofs under
different levels of assumptions for the characterisation of
the devices, and for several types of implementations.
From an experimental point of view, the implementa-
tion of quantum CKA is increasingly accessible, due to
key developments of its fundamental ingredients. Multi-
partite entanglement has been generated in a variety of
physical systems, such as e.g. ion traps [104–106], pho-
tonic systems [107–111], superconducting circuits [112–
114] and nuclear spin qubits in diamond [115]. Also,
entanglement among several particles is naturally gen-
erated in atomic ensembles [116, 117], and methods to
quantify and manipulate this entanglement are being
developed [118–122]. A thermalised interacting photon
gas [123] may also prove to be a suitable source of gen-
uine multipartite entanglement. Recently, the first quan-
tum CKA protocol has been implemented [124] among
four parties. The experiment is based on the multi-
party BB84 protocol [65] discussed in Section IIIA. It re-
lies on the generation of polarization-encoded four-party
GHZ states at telecom wavelength by a central quantum
server. The states are then distributed to the four par-
ties over up to 50 km of optical fibers, generating a secure
conference key according to Definition 4.
While experimental progress is still necessary to scale
implementations of quantum CKA to many users, im-
provements from the theory side are crucial to reduce the
experimental demands. To this aim, the development of
new protocols and new techniques to prove security will
contribute to make quantum CKA a feasible technology.
Novel protocols exploring different resource states and
network architectures can lead to improved performance
and noise robustness. In the bi-partite case, QKD proto-
cols for d-dimensional systems achieve higher rates and
better noise tolerance [125] than the qubit-based proto-
cols. In order to explore this possibility in the multi-
partite case, quantum CKA protocols for d-dimensional
systems need to be developed. Such a generalization can
also find applications in the layered protocol presented
in [126]. In Ref. [126], asymmetric high-dimensional mul-
tipartite entangled states are used to design a layered
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protocol that establishes a secret key simultaneously be-
tween different subsets of users in a network.
Similarly, new tools to improve security proofs can
lead to better rates and noise tolerance, especially for
DICKA protocols. A family of Bell inequalities suit-
able for conference key agreement protocols has been
introduced in [94]. However, only non-tight numerical
lower bounds to the key rates are currently available for
DICKA protocols based on these inequalities. The in-
troduction of tighter analytical bounds addressing their
security proofs could lead to higher key rates in DICKA
protocols.
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